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Hegel's Revival in Analytic Philosophy
Willem A. deVries
University of New Hampshire

Abstract

Analytic philosophy is rediscovering Hegel. This essay examines a particularly strong thread of
new analytic Hegelianism, sometimes called ‘Pittsburgh Hegelianism’, which began with the
work of Wilfrid Sellars. In trying to bring Anglo-American philosophy from its empiricist phase
into a more sophisticated, corrected Kantianism, Sellars moved in substantially Hegelian
directions. Sellars’ work has been extended, and revised by his Pittsburgh colleagues John
McDowell and Robert B. Brandom. The sociality and historicity of reason, the proper treatment
of space and time, conceptual holism, inferentialism, the reality of conceptual structure, the
structure of experience, and the nature of normativity are the central concerns of Pittsburgh
Hegelianism.

Keywords
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analytic philosophy, sociality and historicity of reason, conceptual holism, inferentialism,
conceptual realism, structure of experience, normativity

I.

Introduction: Analytic Philosophy contra Hegel

The analytic tradition dominant in Anglo-American philosophy was born in part in a revolt
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against the neo-Hegelianism that was fairly dominant in English-speaking lands at the end of the
19th century. Throughout much of the 20th century, Hegel was not merely shunned but also
scorned and derided as the exemplar of all that analytic philosophy abjured. However, a
significant revival of interest in Hegel’s philosophy among analytically oriented philosophers
has recently emerged and continues to grow.

Opposition to 19th century the (neo-)Hegelian idealism took several forms. One was a revival of
realism. ‘Realism’, however, is a protean word; in this case the focus is on the contrast to
idealism. Realists hold that there is at least some non-mentalistic component in the vocabulary
that most fundamentally describes the world; mentalistic vocabulary applies only to a limited set
of entities and not to the world-whole. A second form of opposition to Hegelianism was the
reassertion of atomism, not only in nature, but also in semantics and the analysis of the mental.
Atomism, in turn, tends to associate with foundationalist, hierarchical structures; once the
fundamental elements are decided upon, everything else must be composed of them.

The tremendous growth in the sciences during the 19th century surely contributed to the rise of
realism and atomism. By the turn of the century, the idea that the fundamental nature of the
world is to be explicated in terms of a universal self-consciousness or spirit seemed less and less
compelling. With analytic methodologies proving increasingly fruitful time and again in both
science and philosophy, their influence made itself felt in the development of modern logic in the
work of Frege, Peano, and Russell and Whitehead; in the popularity of positivism (the doctrines
of Comte and then Mach, not yet those of the Vienna Circle); in the revival of the British
Empiricist tradition (J.S. Mill was Russell’s godfather); in the careful attention to scientific
methodology paid by C. S. Peirce; and in the rise of the philosophy of science as a significant
sub-discipline. In Germany, Hermann von Helmholtz and the neo-Kantians paid much greater
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attention to the empirical sciences, substituting philosophy of science for Hegelian philosophy of
nature.1

The general secularization of Western society, and especially the universities, also seemed
incompatible with Hegel, who (rightly or wrongly) was widely associated with a heavily
theological and metaphysical philosophy. Similarly, the Hegelianism of the schools (as opposed
to left-wing or Marxist Hegelianism) was associated with political conservatism.

This catalog is far from complete, and these forces did not always push in the same direction.
The empiricism of the early 20th century, for instance, was often phenomenalistic, not realistic.
Philosophy of science, especially in the first few decades following the tremendous blossoming
of physics early in the century, seemed to take theoretical physics, with its increasing panoply of
unobservable entities, as the exemplar of everything scientific, and this put pressure on the shape
any realism could take. The interpretation Russell gave the new symbolic logic was highly
atomistic, foundationalistic, individualistic, and phenomenalistic, which, again, was in tension
with the urge to realism and, at least arguably, the actual procedures of the empirical sciences.

This brief overview helps explain why Hegel was anathema to the analysts: He stood in direct
opposition to the atomism, foundationalism, individualism, reductionism, and materialist realism
that operated in the new-found analytic tradition as regulative ideals. Each of these ‘ideals’ has
since come under attack, not just from outside the analytic tradition, but by the development of
arguments within the tradition (in good Hegelian dialectical fashion). The rest of this article will
follow perhaps the most significant rapprochement with Hegelian philosophy attempted from
within the analytic tradition: the efforts of the so-called ‘Pittsburgh School’.
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The Pittsburgh school originated in the work of Wilfrid S. Sellars (1912-1989). Sellars’ training
in philosophy was cosmopolitan, with schooling in both America and England. In particular, he
had strong ties to the realist traditions in both American and British thought through his father,
Roy Wood Sellars—himself a significant American philosopher, a founder of Critical Realism
and Professor at the University of Michigan for the first half of the 20th century—and his
teachers at Oxford, H. A. Prichard and H. H. Price.

Sellars wrote in the analytic tradition; arguably, he became one of its pillars. Readings in
Philosophical Analysis (1949), edited with Herbert Feigl, became the industry standard reader
for a generation of analysts, and Philosophical Studies, the journal Sellars and Feigl founded in
1950, was the first journal solely devoted to ‘philosophy in the analytic tradition’. Still, Sellars
distinguished himself from most analysts by his broad knowledge and sensitive interpretations of
the history of philosophy, particularly Aristotle and early modern philosophy through Kant. He
was an empirically-minded philosopher who was nonetheless fascinated by rationalist
philosophy. His hope was to move analytic philosophy from its empiricist beginnings into a
more adequate and sophisticated Kantian phase. Arguably, though, Sellars’ own awareness of
the shortcomings of Kant prompted him to develop a far more Hegelian philosophy than would
have been politic at the time to admit. His younger colleagues at Pittsburgh, John McDowell
(1942-) and Robert B. Brandom (1950-), further developed some of Sellars’ insights in their own
work, while also departing from Sellars in various ways.

II.

Sociality and Historicity

Some of Sellars’s references to Hegel are either indirect or subtly critical when read closely, but
some declare his clear allegiance to a Hegelian position. The clearest of these is in ‘Philosophy
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and the Scientific Image of Man’ when Sellars rejects the ‘Robinson Crusoe conception of the
world as generating conceptual thinking directly in the individual’. 2
It was not until the time of Hegel that the essential role of the group as a mediating factor
in this causation [of the presence in the individual of the framework of conceptual
thinking] was recognized, and while it is easy for us to see that the immanence and
transcendence of conceptual frameworks with respect to the individual thinker is a social
phenomenon, and to find a recognition of this fact implicit in the very form of our image
of man in the world, it was not until the nineteenth century that this feature of the
manifest image was, however inadequately, taken into account.3
The social nature of thought and conceptuality remains an invariant commitment of the
Pittsburgh school, reinforced by the influence of Wittgenstein’s later works.

Sellars quickly hedges his endorsement of this Hegelian insight with criticism:
The manifest image must, therefore, be construed as containing a conception of itself as a
group phenomenon, the group mediating between the individual and the intelligible
order. But any attempt to explain this mediation within the framework of the manifest
image was bound to fail, for the manifest image contains the resources for such an
attempt only in the sense that it provides the foundation on which scientific theory can
build an explanatory framework; and while conceptual structures of this framework are
built on the manifest image, they are not definable within it. Thus, the Hegelian, like the
Platonist of whom he is the heir, was limited to the attempt to understand the relation
between intelligible order and individual minds in analogical terms.4

There are several different issues at play here, and we need to keep them separate. One issue
concerns the general status of the conceptual or intelligible order, while another concerns the
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particular status of our currently dominant conceptual framework and its major features. The
relations between these two are complex for both Hegel and Sellars. Both philosophers are, in
one sense of the term, epistemic realists about the conceptual order. That is, they both think that
(descriptive) concepts aim at delimiting the very nature of things; they see no sense in the
Kantian notion of a thing-in-itself that is in principle beyond the reach of the conceptual or the
knowable. But at the same time, they are hardly naïve realists: though concepts aim at
delimiting the nature of things, they also tend to fall short of their target. Indeed, both of them
acknowledge that it takes significant effort to develop successively better and better concepts.
For both Hegel and Sellars, the sociality of thought entails also its historicity. We always
operate with a less than ultimately satisfactory conceptual framework that is fated to be replaced
by something more satisfactory, whether on the basis of conceptual or empirical considerations.

Hegel sketches a complex sequence of ever more sophisticated conceptual schemes in the
Phenomenology. Sellars boils this down to a clash between what he calls the ‘manifest image’
[MI]—the rich commonsense scheme in terms of which we ordinarily make sense of the
world—and the ‘scientific image’[SI]—the incipient and (potentially) radically different scheme
that is starting to be constructed by the empirical sciences.5 For both Hegel and Sellars, grasp of
the Truth lies at the end of a long process.

Although Hegel and Sellars think along related lines with regard to the status of conceptual
frameworks vis-a-vis reality, they differ significantly concerning the content of the ultimate
framework. For any complex conceptual framework, there will be some architecture of
explanatory priorities that makes some concepts more fundamental than others that are to be
explained in terms of more basic concepts. For Hegel, the most general and explanatorily most
basic concepts are those of spirit: reason, concept, subjectivity and objectivity, etc. Ultimately,
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we understand nature in terms of its relation to spirit, and the process by which we come to be
able to grasp the truth is a process by which spirit comes to know itself. Things are quite
otherwise with Sellars, who thinks the explanatorily prior concepts in the scientific image will be
the concepts of materiality.
78. The concepts of ideal matter-of-factual truth and of what there really is are as fraught
with subjunctives pertaining to conceptualization as the idealists have ever claimed. But
no picture6 of the world contains as such mentalistic expressions functioning as such.
The indispensibility and logical irreducibility of mentalistic discourse is compatible with
the idea that in this sense there are no mental acts. Though full of important insights,
Idealism is, therefore, radically false.7
This is a complex claim, but it comes down to the idea that even though mentalistic (or spiritual)
discourse is both indispensible for creatures like us and irreducible to material-object discourse,
in the scientific image the mental will be seen to depend on the material ontologically.8 One’s
ontology is determined by the explanatorily most basic kinds recognized in one’s conceptual
framework. Hegel is undoubtedly an idealist; we can let others worry about how weighty a
metaphysical idealism it is. Sellars is a decided materialist: ‘the solution of the puzzle lay in
correctly locating the conceptual order in the causal order and correctly interpreting the causality
involved’.9

According to Sellars, the manifest image generates questions it cannot answer on its own. Even
augmented with the Hegelian insight that the community is an essential intermediary between
the individual and the intelligible order, Sellars claims that the manifest framework is not in a
position to explain how the community serves this role. This is a complex thought. First, what
Sellars calls the ‘intelligible order’ is the network of rational connections among the concepts of
a conceptual framework.10 For example, our confidence that brothers are male siblings and that
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water turns to ice when cooled sufficiently are both expressions of connections that have come to
be built in to the intelligible order made available to us by our conceptual framework/language.

As noted above, until the 19th century, philosophers believed that these rational connections are
learned by means of some action of the world (broadly construed) upon our individual minds.
Furthermore, according to Sellars, ‘[i]n the Platonic tradition this mode of causation is attributed
to a being which is analogous, to a greater or lesser degree, to a person’. 11 In Sellars’ view,
Hegel, as a member in good standing of the Platonic tradition, also sought to understand the
relation between intelligible order and individual mind in terms of something person-like that
accounts for how individuals come to possess a (normatively constituted) conceptual framework
in terms of which the world in which they live can be understood. This is spirit informing the
activity and pervading the being of the human individual. Spirit is not like an individual person,
localized in space and time, nor is it outside of space and time, but its fundamental structure is
still that of a synthetic, rational unity, a mind. It makes sense to attribute ‘cunning’ to spirit, for
instance.

Sellars’s view is that the manifest image cannot explain how it is that the community (or spirit)
mediates the individual’s acquisition of a conceptual framework. Sellars gives us no argument
in PSIM for this negative claim. He needs a positive argument to establish that the manifest
image cannot develop such an explanation and that we must turn to a radically novel scientific
framework to do so. The manifest image has shown itself in the past to be a flexible tool for
coping with reality, capable of growth and development in order to accommodate an ever richer
understanding of the structure of reality and our relation to it.

Sellars does say that with the resources of the MI, we could generate an understanding of the
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relation between the individual and the intelligible order ‘in analogical terms’. That is, their
relationship is understood by construing it as analogous to something else understood fairly well
independently, such as a form of perception, which we have some grasp of, aimed at a special
object, e.g., Platonic forms. Calling it an analogical understanding sounds fairly dismissive, as if
such an understanding is something to be transcended. In a sense, that’s what Sellars thinks, but
even if we manage to transcend this analogy-based understanding, it does not follow that it
should or even can be discarded. According to Sellars, conceptions of psychological states are
developed in analogical terms, and even though Sellars believes that, in the final wash, there are
no mental acts, he never intimates that we can or should abandon the language of psychology
(although some of Sellars’s students have drawn that conclusion). Sellars insists that the
language of ‘individual and community intentions’—the very heart of the manifest image—must
be joined to, or better, preserved within the future scientific image.12 Refining the language of
intentions—the language of sociology, social psychology, family life, and politics—has been on
the agenda since the time of Hegel, but Sellars thinks there is a limit to the progress that can be
made in these directions with armchair methodologies.

A split has developed among the followers of Sellars, often described (with obvious reference to
the history of Hegel reception) as a split between ‘right-wing’ and ‘left-wing’ Sellarsians. Not
everyone agrees on just what the divide is, but it seems to center on the weight one gives the
natural sciences in ontology. Right-wing Sellarsians retain Sellars’ declared scientific realism:
the empirical ontology of the world is strictly a matter for science to settle, and that ‘means
displacing the everyday ontology of commonsense. Left-wing Sellarsians endorse Sellars’
rejection of the given and his analysis of the intentional (by and large), but reject the strident
scientific realism that declares that ‘in the dimension of describing and explaining the world,
science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not’. 13
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(Interestingly, it is the right-wing Sellarsians who are more radical and the left more
conservative.) Brandom and McDowell are left-wing Sellarsians; both reject the notion that
science will cast significant light on the norm-constituted concepts that articulate human
intentionality.

Sellars himself was a right-wing Sellarsian, and he thinks we are now able ‘to see this [problem
of the acquisition of a conceptual scheme] as a matter of evolutionary development as a group
phenomenon’.14 The point is that evolution can generate categorially new objects, even
something like a conceptual scheme.15 Ruth Millikan, for instance, has shown how such
processes can be accommodated within a generally Sellarsian view. 16 Yet one of the great lacks
in Sellars’s philosophy is a treatment of the biological and social sciences. This is not sheer
accident, for accommodating teleologically constituted biological or normatively constituted
social phenomena within the causal structures central to science’s concerns is a daunting
challenge.

How are we to construe the relations among irreducibly distinct groups of concepts, all of which
seem to be necessary for a full comprehension of our multifarious world? Arguably, both Sellars
and Hegel believe that there is some privileged set of concepts, some privileged layer of
discourse, that provides the most universal and encompassing viewpoint on the world, its history,
and our place in it. This then determines our ultimate ontology: materialistic for Sellars,
idealistic for Hegel. Neither seems to take seriously that the irreducibility of these different sets
of concepts is itself indicative of the ultimate furniture of the world.

III.

The Myth of the Atomic

deVries

for OUP Handbook of Hegel

Page 11

Sellars is most commonly identified with the critique of the myth of the given first articulated in
his classic essay “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. This critique can be construed
along fairly narrow epistemological lines, but it really reaches across the full range of the
cognitive as a critique of any atomistic, foundationalistic construal of the structure of meaningful
human activity, both theoretical and practical. That is, Sellars denies that the epistemic,
semantic, or intentional properties of any episodes or states accrue to them either in isolation or
as simply descriptive properties.
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we
are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the
logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. 17
‘Empirical’ is used here as G. E. Moore used ‘natural’, to stand for the purely matter-of-factual
in contrast to anything normative or evaluative. The ‘logical space of reasons’ is, first, an
abstract space, that is, an array of potential positions, the identity of which is determined
(holistically) by their relations to the other potential positions, and, second, an essentially
normative realm, structured by the oughts and ought-nots of good inference (both formal and
material).18 Epistemic givens would be states that possess their epistemic status independently of
their (epistemic) relations to any other states, e.g., a self-justifying belief or a belief that is
warranted simply because it is caused in a certain way. Semantic givens would be states that
possess a certain meaning independently of their (semantic) relations to any other states, e.g.,
because they are intrinsically intelligible or derive meaning from some (non-normative)
‘ostensive tie’ to some object.

Thus, Sellars denies both that there are ‘atoms’ of knowledge or meaning independent of their
relation to other ‘pieces’ of knowledge or meaning, and that they are structured in a neat
hierarchy rather than an interlocking (social) network. The determinate content of a thought or
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utterance is fixed by its position in the space of implications and employments available to the
community in its language or conceptual framework. This kind of holism is congenial to
Hegelian modes of thinking. It is important to see, however, that Sellars also rejects standard
forms of coherentism.
Above all, the [standard] picture is misleading because of its static character. One seems
forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (What
supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its
tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither will do. For empirical knowledge, like
its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but
because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not
all at once.19
This seems like a rejection of Hegel, but it is, of course, a rejection of the cartoon version of
Hegel that was all too dominant in Anglo-American philosophy. Recognition of the dynamics,
of the dialectics of thought is precisely what is needed to fix the imagery.

IV.

The Return to Experience

Sellars’ attempt to escape the apparently forced choice between foundationalism and
coherentism was picked up to great notice in John McDowell’s 1994 book Mind and World,
wherein he wants to help us escape the ‘intolerable oscillation’ that has characterized modern
philosophy between coherentism, a theory that gives us only a ‘frictionless spinning in the void’
which ‘cannot make sense of the bearing of thought on objective reality,’ and foundationalism,
‘an appea1to the given, which turns out to be useless’. 20 For both Sellars and McDowell,
resolving this tension means developing a more adequate conception of experience itself, one
that embodies the Kantian insight that experience is both sensory and conceptual, aetiologically
non-inferential yet justificationally embedded in an inferentially structured matrix.
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But Sellars and McDowell do not agree on the proper conception of experience. Sellars retains a
significant, though non-epistemic role for the sensory, non-conceptual content of experience.
[B]y denying that sense impressions, however indispensable to cognition, were
themselves cognitive, Kant made a radical break with all his predecessors, empiricists
and rationalists alike. The ‘of-ness’ of sensation simply isn’t the ‘of-ness’ of even the
most rudimentary thought. . . . But his own question haunted me. How is it possible that
knowledge has this structure? . . . It wasn’t until much later that I came to see that the
solution of the puzzle lay in correctly locating the conceptual order in the causal order
and correctly interpreting the causality involved. 21
For Sellars, then, experience is a double-sided coin. The sensory aspect of experience is part of
the causal story of the impact of the world upon us, but its conceptual aspect locates it within the
logical space of reasons, the space of reasons for belief and for action. 22 Early on, McDowell
rejected the idea that ‘receptivity makes an even notionally separable contribution to its cooperation with spontaneity’,23 though in later works he backs away from this fairly extreme
position.

IVA. Realism, the Phenomenal, and Transcendental Idealism
The differences between Sellars and McDowell are significant, and we can see them as differing
responses to Kant’s transcendental idealism, which neither Sellars nor McDowell finds
attractive. Both Sellars and McDowell want to be realists, not merely empirical realists à la
Kant, but realists for whom the distinction between things as we know them and things as they
are evaporates. But they take very different routes to this desired goal. McDowell proclaims
that
In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takes in is that things are
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thus and so. That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be
the content of a judgement: it becomes the content of a judgement if the subject decides
to take the experience at face value. So it is conceptual content. But that things are thus
and so is also, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the world: it is how things
are. Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of receptivity puts us in a
position to speak of experience as openness to the layout of reality. 24

Sellars’ and McDowell’s different responses to Kantian transcendental idealism reveal their
relations to Hegel. Like Sellars and McDowell, Hegel is an epistemological realist: he rejects
the idea that we do not (or are not even able to) know things as they are in themselves. Yet
neither Hegel nor Sellars wants to reject altogether the distinction between phenomenal reality
and things as they are in themselves. Sellars calls the distinction between the phenomenal and
the real the distinction between the manifest and the scientific images of man in the world.
Hegel provides for numerous phenomenal realities related in ways that require a phenomenology
to understand. It is not the distinction between phenomenon and reality itself that Hegel and
Sellars attack, but the notion that it is absolute, establishing an unbridgeable divide.25
McDowell, however, is concerned to defend our ‘openness to the layout of reality’ and seems
not to take seriously the idea that we might have systematically false beliefs about the nature of
things.26 On this score, Sellars is more Hegelian than McDowell.

IVB. Space, Time, and a Full-Fledged Epistemological Realism
Kant’s arguments for transcendental idealism turn crucially on the status of space and time.
Hegel, Sellars, and McDowell, however, all reject Kant’s notion that space and time can be only
subjective conditions of human receptivity.
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Despite the many differences between Hegel and Sellars in their development of a full-fledged
epistemological realism, there is a fundamental similarity in their strategy.27 The strategy, boiled
down, is this: Kant’s critical philosophy is formulated in terms of basic dualisms,
apriori/aposteriori, analytic/synthetic, receptivity/spontaneity, even empirical
science/philosophy. Hegel insists that trapped in these dualisms Kant cannot satisfactorily
explain human cognition or action. The gaps imposed by the assumed dualisms never get
properly bridged. Hegel therefore reconceives the critical project. Hegel abandons rigid
dualisms and recognizes that human life is a dynamic, fallible enterprise that begins from
relative ignorance (even of ourselves), is fraught with contradictions to be overcome, and works
itself slowly via constant revision towards an ever more adequate grasp of and fittedness to the
reality within which (as opposed to over against which) we live. Any distinctions that arise must
be explained, not assumed, including categorial distinctions. If we do not begin with starkly
dualistic assumptions, the reasonableness of a belief in unknowable things in themselves never
forces itself upon us.

Sellars’ response to Kant is strikingly similar, for Sellars also recognizes that there is no
Archimedean point outside of common reality from which the critic can operate. He also rejects
absolute, hard and fast dualisms in favor of limited and pragmatically justified distinctions. As
Paul Redding argues, Hegel and Sellars reject both an exogenous and an endogenous given. 28
That is, neither empirical content nor conceptual scheme are given to us independently of the
other. But if conceptual form is not given independently of the real world, there is little reason
to think that it is related only contingently to that world and affords us a mode of access to it
unrelated to what that world is in itself. In Sellars’ view, as well as Hegel’s, human life is a
dynamic, fallible enterprise that begins from relative ignorance (even of ourselves), is fraught
with contradictions to be overcome, and works itself slowly via constant revision towards an
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ever more adequate grasp of and fittedness to the reality within which (as opposed to over
against which) we live.

McDowell expresses his concern with Kant’s transcendental idealism as a worry that it reduces
experience and knowledge to ‘facts about us’. He agrees that neither empirical content nor
conceptual scheme are given to us independently of the other. But rather than trying to accord
sensation as something non-conceptual a distinguishable place in experience, like Sellars and
Hegel, McDowell denies that there is anything non-conceptual in experience. Space and time
should not be seen as forms of a distinct, non-conceptual element in experience, but, as
McDowell claims Hegel also thought, as further categorial forms of the conceptual content in
experience. The sensory is, thus, not an intermediary between understanding and the world, but
a way in which we are open to the world, a shaping of our consciousness of the world.
When Kant makes it look as if the forms of our sensibility are brute-fact features of our
subjectivity, it becomes difficult to see how they could also be forms of the manifestness
to us of what is genuinely objective. But when, in the move Hegel applauds, Kant puts
the forms of our sensibility on a level with the categories, he takes a step towards making
it possible to see the forms of our sensibility, no less than the categories, as genuinely
forms of cognition -- at once forms of subjective activity and forms of genuine
objectivity with which that activity engages. 29

Assimilating space and time to the other categories of conceptuality and essentially ignoring
them as forms intrinsic to the self-external is not at all clearly Hegelian. 30 Furthermore,
McDowell’s deconstruction of the intuition/concept distinction undercuts the Kantianism that he
claims to be defending. What, after all, is left once Kant’s his claim that there are two
independent sources of knowledge that combine in experience is rejected? 31 In this light,
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McDowell’s move seems less a radicalization of Kant than a retreat to Leibniz.

IVC. A Form of Idealism
Still, there is a clear sense in which McDowell espouses idealism. For McDowell endorses
Wittgenstein’s dictum that ‘The world is everything that is the case’. 32
And if we do say that and mean it, we conceive the world, not … as a totality of the
describable things -- zebras and so forth -- that there are (as we say) in it, but as
precisely, everything that can be truly thought or said: not everything we would think
about if we thought truly, but everything we would think.33
McDowell goes on to say, ‘This is an idealism in an obvious sense. On this conception, the
world itself is indeed structured by the form of judgment’.34

These claims reveal McDowell’s idealism as a form of logical realism. The fundamental
structure of McDowell’s world is logical or conceptual structure, and the primary force of that
claim is that it (1) denies that either spatio-temporal or causal structure is fundamental except
insofar as space, time, and causation are themselves logical categories and (2) explains the sense
in which we are ‘open to the world’. Said differently, for McDowell, the logical space of
reasons includes the entirety of the world and subsumes the nominally distinct space of objects,
causes, or laws. McDowell’s normative realism, the doctrine that normative demands and
prohibitions are not just believed-in, but actually out there in the world for us to respond to, is
essential to his view here. It is a Hegelian position to see a deep identity between the
fundamental structures of world and the fundamental structure of good thought. Here McDowell
is clearly more Hegelian than Sellars.

Sellars rejects the idea that the world is the totality of facts, for, according to Sellars, fact-talk is
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material-mode truth-talk. That is why facts have logical structure. Sellars thinks the world itself
is a totality of objects, and objects do not have logical structure. Empirical objects have causal
and spatio-temporal structure; logical analysis and empirical science are different enterprises,
however much cross-fertilization is desirable. Whereas McDowell (and Hegel) unifies the
causal and the conceptual realms by subsuming the causal under the conceptual, Sellars unifies
them, as we saw above (Cf. Autobiographical Reflections: 285), by incorporating the conceptual
within the causal order. This does not mean reducing the conceptual to the causal, but only, as
he says, ‘locating the conceptual order in the causal order’.

McDowell’s quietism departs from Hegel, however. McDowell abjures grand philosophical or
metaphysical constructions and insists that the point of good philosophy is to make it possible to
stop doing philosophy, to remove any spur or urge to engage in such abstruse speculations. Also
missing from McDowell’s position is a Hegelian sense of philosophical development or growth.
Since McDowell holds (like Wittgenstein) that in ordinary language and common sense
everything is in order, there is and could be no grand narrative of the development of philosophy,
only a contingent series of corrections when thinking goes awry. Deep metaphysical modesty
combined with a static conception of the philosophical realm seems, however, unHegelian.
Hegel argues for the need for philosophy, and he does not intend that his efforts will leave
everything in place. And who has a deeper commitment to the dynamism of philosophical
theory than Hegel? Whether metaphysical or not, Hegel is a philosophical theoretician on a
grand scale, and Sellars, with his metaphysical courage and dynamic understanding of the
development of human understanding, is closer to Hegel’s spirit in this regard, however much
his philosophical materialism opposes Hegel’s absolute idealism.

V.

Semantic Dynamism
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Sellars, Functional Classification, and Inferentialism

In different ways Sellars and McDowell resemble Hegel in their attempts to avoid Kant’s
transcendental idealism while still maintaining an anti-foundationalist epistemological realism.
This concerns relatively large-scale structural features of the mind’s relation to the world. If that
were the only way in which the Pittsburgh school ‘revived’ Hegel, it would be pretty thin beer.
But the school also has a lot to say about the nature of conceptuality itself, and what it says
resonates with Hegelian overtones. It is here that Brandom’s work comes to the fore, elaborating
a base established by Sellars.

Coherence can be invoked in a theory of truth, a theory of meaning (or of concepts), and a theory
of justification or knowledge.35 Sellars exploits all three forms. As mentioned,
epistemologically there are no stand-alone justifiers for Sellars, and semantically, meaning and
intentionality concern the functional role of symbolic states in complex systems of behavioral
modulation.

According to Sellars, semantics is a matter of functional classification. To say what an utterance
or a thought means is to say what role it plays in the linguistic/conceptual economy of the
community. We do not usually do this by giving a detailed and complex description of that role,
but by giving an equivalent phrase, hopefully intelligible to one’s interlocutor, that plays a
similar role. So, when we say things like
‘Brother’ means male sibling
‘Geschwindigkeitsbegrenzung’ in German means speed limit
we use the phrase to the right of ‘means’ to delimit the role of the phrase on the left hand side by
providing a phrase in our background language with a relevantly similar role. Sellars points to
three dimensions of the functional role of an expression: its role in (1) language-entry
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transitions; (2) language-exit transitions; and (3) intralinguistic transitions. Thus, this is a use
theory of semantics. Language-entry transitions include observation statements, in which
interaction with one’s environment evokes a linguistic response; language-exit transitions
include statements of intention that evolve into actions. Most interesting for our purposes are the
intralinguistic transitions, in which one moves from one utterance or thought to another. When
purporting to adhere to conceptual proprieties, such transitions are known as inferences. In
“Inference and Meaning” Sellars argues that the meaning of an expression is crucially
determined by its contribution to good inferences, both formal and material.36 Formally good
inferences, e.g., modus ponens, are good in virtue of their syntactic form. Materially good
inferences do not rely on syntax. The inferences
The cube is red

It is raining

So, the cube is colored

So, it will be wet outside

are not formally valid, but they are good material inferences. Sellars denies that we ought to
think of them as essentially enthymematic: not all inference licenses can be made into explicit
premises.37 For Sellars, such facts about inferential proprieties determine both the form and the
content of our judgings and the concepts used in them.
23. . . . . To say of a judging that it has a certain logical form is to classify it and its
constituents with respect to their epistemic powers.
24. If judgings qua conceptual acts have “form,” they also have “content.” . . . . The
temptation is to think of the “content” of an act as an entity that is “contained” by it. But
if the “form” of a judging is the structure by virtue of which it is possessed of certain
generic logical or epistemic powers, surely the content must be the character by virtue of
which the act has specific modes of these generic logical or epistemic powers.38
One consequence of this view is that linguistic/semantic form and content are not radically
different. If, e.g., physical object judgments have their own ‘form’ (perhaps, e.g., suppressible
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default inferences concerning spatio-temporal location, causal connectivity, or appropriate forms
of evidence), then judgments about rocks fill in or specify this form in determinate ways.

In Sellars’ view all semantic predicates are ultimately metalinguistic functional classifiers. It is
not just meaning statements that classify expressions functionally; so do reference statements
and even truth attributions. Sellars thus denies that meaning, reference, or truth denote relations
between words or thoughts and objects in the world.39 This is sometimes described as a rejection
of representationalism, though Sellars talks regularly about representations, both linguistic and
mental. He certainly rejects the idea that there is some set of specific, fundamental semantic
‘relations’ between language or concept and the world (say, the meaning, reference, or
satisfaction relations) that determines our ontology.

Sellars’ doctrine relates fairly clearly to Hegel. One of Kant’s revisions to the ‘new way of
ideas’ that dominated the thought of his predecessors was his insistence on the priority of
judgment over concepts; a concept, for Kant, is basically a predicate of a possible judgment
(A69/B94). Hegel takes this move one step further: judgments are elements of possible
inferences. Hegel’s Concept self-elaborates into a syllogism, showing itself as a synthesizer or
unifier of other concepts. The Hegelian view that concepts are determined by their place in an
inferentially articulated system is highly compatible with Sellars’ overall view of semantics and
intentionality.

VB.

Brandom’s Hegelianism: Intentionality, Normativity, and the Structure of
Authority

Brandom spells out more fully how this is supposed to work, taking up the inferentialist
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conception of semantics that Sellars really only sketched in outline and elaborating it
significantly. In this regard Brandom is the most explicitly Hegelian of the Pittsburgh school.
He has also written more on Hegel than his colleagues, and has been working for years on a
commentary on the Phenomenology of Spirit, successive drafts of which are available on his
website. Here I draw mainly on his Woodbridge Lectures, a broad overview of his interpretation
of German idealism and Hegel’s particular position in that movement.40 These lectures are more
relevant to our purposes here than the details of the Phenomenology.

Brandom sees Hegel as modifying several central themes in Kant’s transcendental idealism. The
first of these Kantian themes is the realization that intentionality, the fundamental defining trait
of the mental, is, at root, a normative affair.
What distinguishes judging and intentional doing from the activities of non-sapient
creatures is not that they involve some special sort of mental processes, but that they are
things knowers and agents are in a distinctive way responsible for. Judging and acting
involve commitments. They are endorsements, exercises of authority.41
This is Sellars’ idea that intentional state attributions locate the subject in ‘the logical space of
reasons’. Sapience (conceptual thought) involves responsibility, and the fundamental
responsibility, according to Brandom, is to integrate one’s intentional states (both one’s past
states and one’s growing accumulation of new intentional states) into a total unity of
apperception. This involves elaborating and adopting the material and formal consequences of
one’s intentional states and eliminating conflicts that may arise among them. One is, thus,
responsible for one’s thoughts and actions, the contents of which are determined by their
relations (again, both formal and material) to other intentional states (echoing Sellars’ coherence
theory of meaning and intentionality); and one is responsible to the objects of one’s judgments
insofar as they (the objects) set the standard of correctness for the commitments one undertakes
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in judging. It is the synthetic activity of “integrating judgments with one another, by critical
exclusion and ampliative inclusion or extension [that] makes the concepts both of subject and of
object intelligible”.42

The second Kantian theme in Hegel concerns the nature of normativity itself. Kant’s
Enlightenment twist is the attitude-dependence of norms, which come to exist only when humans
start taking and treating each other as authoritative, responsible, committed, etc. Kant’s
understanding of the attitude-dependence of normativity puts the notion of autonomy, selfgovernance, center stage: ‘we, as subjects, are genuinely normatively constrained only by rules
we constrain ourselves by, those that we adopt and acknowledge as binding on us’.43 If
normativity is grounded in the autonomy of individuals, however, there is a potential problem.
If it were up to us both whether we are bound by or responsible to a particular conceptual norm,
which is a matter of the normative force of our judgmental act, and what it is we are bound to,
the content of the judgmental act, then whatever seems right to one would be right. In that case,
normativity collapses, because there is no sense to getting things right or wrong. The norms of
force and content must be relatively independent of each other.
Hegel’s principal innovation is his idea that in order to follow through on Kant’s
fundamental insight into the essentially normative character of mind, meaning, and
rationality, we need to recognize that normative statuses such as authority and
responsibility are at base social statuses.44
It is not just within an individual that the synthetic activity of rational integration occurs. Such
activity is meaningful only when individuals rationally integrate themselves into a community.
We could put it this way: The older obedience model of authority takes the status of the
commander to be the relevant independent variable in the normative; Kant’s autonomy model
takes the status of commandee to be the relevant independent variable; Hegel insists that both are
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relevant and importantly but not absolutely independent.
What institutes normative statuses is reciprocal recognition. Someone becomes
responsible only when others hold him responsible, and exercises authority only when
others acknowledge that authority. One has the authority to petition others for
recognition, in an attempt to become responsible or authoritative. To do that, one must
recognize others as able to hold one responsible or acknowledge one’s authority. This is
according those others a certain kind of authority. To achieve such statuses, one must be
recognized by them in turn. That is to make oneself in a certain sense responsible to
them. But they have that authority only insofar as one grants it to them by recognizing
them as authoritative.45
It is up to me whether I assert, doubt, imagine, etc. that the wire in my hand is copper; it is not up
to me what the formal and material consequences connected with that particular content are. By
subjecting myself to the constraints of linguistic rules that are not ‘up to me’ (a surrender of a
certain negative freedom), I in fact gain access to the expressive power of a natural language and
the radical semantic novelty it makes available. This enables a massive expansion of my
positive expressive freedom. Language is not the only social practice in which reciprocally
recognitive structures yield huge gains in positive freedom.

How do these two stories, the synthesis of the self and the social model of normativity, fit
together into an overall Hegelian view? According to Brandom, they must both be placed in a
larger historical developmental structure. Brandom employs the common law tradition of
jurisprudence as a partial model of the kind of historical developmental structure he has in mind
here. In common law, judges have a fair amount of discretion in deciding whether and how a
law applies to a given situation, but they are under an obligation to say how their application of
the law is consistent with, extends, or even corrects the precedents in hand. And no one decision
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settles such matters; each is a petition to future judges to see their cases in the same light.
Ongoing social practices of integrating old and new commitments institute the normative
statuses of authority and responsibility. That is, they are sufficient to create and sustain the
normative statuses that constitute the logical space of reasons.

It is this historical process that determines (by progressive refinement) the contents of our
concepts. In order to understand how that could be, however, Brandom argues that we need a
different notion of determinateness from the one generally assumed by mainstream analytic
philosophy. Brandom describes what he calls ‘Fregean determinateness’ as involving ‘sharp,
complete boundaries’.46 For each such concept, it is a settled matter, semantically speaking,
whether it applies to any object, definitively and in advance of any actual application. Hegel
disparages such a vision of the conceptual realm as the attitude of ‘Verstand’, understanding.
In its place Hegel proposes a vision of the conceptual realm he calls ‘Vernunft’, reason. The
rational knower realizes that her concepts (her commitments and entitlements) are rarely finally
fixed, they are almost always open-ended, susceptible to refinement, correction, even relocation
in the overall scheme, and these adjustments are moments in an on-going story of the
justification and integration of our commitments. (Recall here the de-absolutization of the
apriori/aposteriori distinction mentioned earlier.) The rational unity we strive for among our
representations is not a merely synchronic unity, but also a diachronic narrative of growth and
elaboration. This view of conceptual determinateness is temporally perspectival: concepts exist
in time with both forward- and backward-looking components.47

Such a sequence reconstructs the history of one’s current view as gradually making explicit what
was previously only implicit; it reveals one’s present view as the result of progress in the
epistemic and/or practical realms from an earlier, less refined position.
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In taking one’s current commitments as the standard to judge what counts as expressive
progress, one is taking them as the reality of which previous constellations of
endorsements were ever more complete and accurate appearances.48
Hegel is working out the idea that conceptual content is
articulated by non-monotonic, seriously multipremise material inferential and
incompatibility relations, in the context of the realization (which we latecomers to the
point associate with Quine, and he associated with Duhem) that those relations depend on
the whole context of collateral discursive commitments.49

The conceptual contents of thoughts are articulated by the material consequential and
incompatibility relations that hold among them. Brandom then makes his own move towards a
conceptual realism,
The principled parallel between the deontic modal relations of inclusion and exclusion
that articulate our thought on the subjective side, and the alethic modal relations of
inclusion and exclusion that articulate the world on the objective side . . . define a
structural conception of the conceptual according to which thought and the world thought
about can both be seen to be conceptually structured. This conceptual realism about
objective reality is, in the context of the other metatheoretic commitments we have been
considering, just a consequence of modal realism: taking it that objective states of affairs
really do necessitate and rule out one another. 50
Thus, while Sellars would shudder at the thought that the (quasi-)logical relations that connect
the contents of our thoughts are ‘of the same generic kind’ as the causal and compositional
relations among the objects, events, and facts of nature, Brandom makes common cause with
McDowell’s logico-conceptual realism. This is the truth in Hegel’s absolute idealism. As
Brandom argues, the claim is not that natural objects are mind-dependent, particularly not on the
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peculiarities of human subjectivity nor in any causal sense of ‘dependent’. Rather, the activities
pragmatically constitutive of the objectivity of thinking about a modally structured world are
connected intrinsically with the activities pragmatically constitutive of normatively wellstructured thought. Being an object and being a fact are themselves also normative statuses.

Brandom’s Hegel ends up, then, preparing the way for Brandom himself. While Brandom shows
us a way to read Hegel that puts logic and semantics properly at the heart of his concerns and ties
those to modern approaches to such issues, it is far from clear how smoothly Brandom’s view
map onto Hegel’s. Brandom’s own cavalier attitude towards the notion of ‘experience’ seems
quite foreign to Hegel. Brandom has not delved far into social or political philosophy, though its
foundations play a large role in his philosophy. He has mostly borrowed his social/political
philosophy eclectically from the German idealists. He faces, at bottom, the task of reconciling 3
doctrines:
1. Concepts are constituted by norms.
2. Norms are attitude-dependent.
3. Conceptual realism: the world (and not just our thinking about it) is conceptually
structured.
Brandom’s non-metaphysical reading of Hegel convinces him he can claim to be Hegelian
without incurring the metaphysical commitments traditionally attributed to Hegel. Thus,
Brandom’s reconstruction of the Hegelian system does not seem to constitute an ontological
proof of God’s existence, but we can pose the question to Brandom: does his conceptual realism
ultimately commit him as well to the Idea?

VI.

Conclusion: Reality and Concept in Dynamic Interaction

Their conceptual realism is the most significant tie to Hegelian doctrine shared by McDowell
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and Brandom. But there are distinctions to be drawn between them, despite this common
element. McDowell rejects the Sellarsian functionalistic analysis of meaning (and reference) in
favor of a Davidsonian view that, he thinks, still entitles him to think of intentionality as a
relation.51 However, this generates some tension with McDowell’s Sellarsian commitments.
The notion that intentionality is a mind-world relation runs into difficulties in either a Sellarsian
or Hegelian context. First, it makes it difficult to make sense out of conceptual change: if our
concept of, say, water changes, wouldn’t it either have to relate to a different object or relate in a
different way to the same object? It thus is not clear how a concept can be the same concept
through conceptual change. Second, if intentionality is a matter of normative status—one of the
founding insights of the Pittsburgh school—then the relation between word (or mind) and world
is, well, what? A normative relation? But what is that? A relation that ought to be or is
supposed to be is not therefore a relation that is.

In contrast to McDowell, Brandom retains and elaborates Sellars’ functionalist semantics, fitting
much more smoothly with both the phenomena of conceptual change and the commitment to the
normativity of intentionality. Sellars attempts to fit the structural insights of German idealism
into a naturalistic framework that assigns to natural science authority over the ontology of the
empirical world. This, however, in Sellars’ view, requires denying that normative features of the
world are part of its empirical furniture; they are solely features of our social relationships and
practices. Both McDowell and Brandom seek to give the normative realm a deeper tie to
empirical reality, either by virtue of a relation that unites the intentional and the material realms
or a structural parallelism that plays that role.

This review has skimmed a number of surfaces; it has not plumbed the depths or the details of
these sophisticated thinkers to any great degree. Yet the Pittsburgh school acknowledges and

deVries

for OUP Handbook of Hegel

Page 29

accommodates significant Hegelian insights. Foremost among these are Hegel’s recognition of
the dynamic, inferential, social, and historical realization of rational and normative structures in
human thought. The ontology of the normative remains in dispute, but there is every reason for
analytic philosophers to recognize Hegel as one of the most significant and profound
contributors to the canon of Western philosophy, someone whom we can with profit study and
learn from.52
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